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INTERESTS OF AMICI CURIAE1 
 
The Washington Legal Foundation (WLF) is a public interest, law and 
policy center with supporters in all 50 states.  WLF regularly appears before 
federal and state courts to promote economic liberty, free enterprise, and a limited 
and accountable government.  WLF routinely litigates in support of efforts to 
ensure a strict separation of powers between federal and state governments as a 
means of preventing too much power from being concentrated within a single 
governmental body.  
The remaining amici are all legal scholars specializing in constitutional law 
and related fields.  Based on their substantial legal expertise, they believe that 
Section 1501 of the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act exceeds the bounds 
of Congress’s constitutional authority.  Amici include Jonathan Adler, Professor of 
Law and Director, Center of Business Law and Regulation, Case Western Reserve 
University School of Law; George Dent, Schott-van den Eynden Professor of Law, 
Case Western University School of Law; Michael Distelhorst, Professor of Law, 
Capital University Law School; James W. Ely, Jr., Milton R. Underwood Professor 
of Law Emeritus, Vanderbilt University Law School; Elizabeth Price Foley, 
                                                 
1 Pursuant to Federal Rule of Appellate Procedure 29(c), amici state that no 
counsel for any party authored this brief in whole or in part, and that no person or 
entity, other than amici and their counsel, made a monetary contribution intended 
to fund the preparation and submission of this brief.  All parties to this dispute 
have consented to the filing of this brief. 
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Professor of Law, Florida International University College of Law; Kurt Lash, 
Alumni Distinguished Professor of Law and Co-Director of the Program on 
Constitutional Theory, History and Law, University of Illinois College of Law; 
David N. Mayer, Professor of Law and History, Capital University Law School; 
Andrew Morris, University of Alabama School of Law; Leonard J. Nelson III, 
Professor of Law, Samford University’s Cumberland School of Law; Stephen B. 
Presser, Raoul Berger Professor of Legal History, Northwestern University School 
of Law; Ronald J. Rychlak, Associate Dean for Academic Affairs and Professor of 
Law, University of Mississippi School of Law; Steven J. Willis, Professor of Law, 
University of Florida Levin College of Law; and, Todd J. Zywicki, Foundation 
Professor of Law, George Mason University School of Law.  
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUE 
 Whether Congress’s authority to regulate interstate commercial activity 
includes the power to compel commercially inactive individuals to enter into 
commercial activity. 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
 
 The district court’s grant of summary judgment below should be affirmed. 
Section 1501 of the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act, which seeks to 
compel most Americans to purchase health insurance by 2014, goes well beyond 
any previous exercise of federal authority.  See §1501(b), 10106, Pub. L. No. 111-
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148, 124 Stat. 119 (2010) (“PPACA”).  Even the broadest Supreme Court 
precedents interpreting the limits of federal power do not give Congress the 
authority to force Americans to purchase a product they do not want.2   
The “first principles” of the Constitution are that it “creates a Federal 
Government of enumerated powers.”  United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 552, 
115 S. Ct. 1624, 1626 (1995) (quoting THE FEDERALIST NO. 45).  As James 
Madison observed, “‘[t]he powers delegated by the proposed Constitution to the 
federal government are few and defined.  Those which are to remain in the State 
governments are numerous and indefinite.’”  Id.  The federal government, Madison 
emphasized, is not granted “an indefinite supremacy over all persons and things.”  
THE FEDERALIST  NO. 39.  These principles are both vindicated and preserved by 
the district court’s ruling below.   
  The Commerce Clause authorizes Congress to regulate “economic activity” 
and “noneconomic activity” when controlling the latter is “an essential part of a 
larger regulation of economic activity.”  Lopez, 514 U.S. at 561, 115 S. Ct. at 
1631; see also United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598, 610, 120 S. Ct. 1740, 1750 
(2000) (quoting Lopez).   But nothing in the Court’s Commerce Clause precedents 
                                                 
2 This brief addresses only the Department’s Commerce Clause and 
Necessary and Proper Clause arguments.  Amici have previously addressed 
elsewhere the Department’s Taxing Clause arguments.  See Amicus Br. of Wash. 
Legal Found. & Const. Law Scholars, Commonwealth of Virginia  v. Sebelius, 
2010 WL 3952344, at *17-20 (E.D. Va. Oct. 4, 2010).   
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gives Congress the power to force private citizens to engage in economic 
transactions they prefer to avoid. 
 Apparently conceding that some “activity” is required to trigger the 
Commerce Clause power, the Department argues that the individual mandate 
regulates “the practice of consuming health care services without insurance.”  
Appellants’ Br. at 28.  Yet the individual mandate regulates neither consumption 
nor any other activity, but applies instead to virtually all uninsured Americans 
whether or not they consume health care services.  If the individual mandate 
operated as the Department claims, one could simply avoid the mandate by not 
consuming health care services; but such “opting out” is not allowed.    
If, as the Department suggests, the Commerce power extends to all 
economic decisions as well as all economic activities, Congress would enjoy 
unlimited authority to mandate any kind of behavior.  After all, any decision to do 
(or not do) virtually anything has some economic impact.  Nor is there any special 
attribute of the health care market that makes refusal to purchase health insurance 
more of an “economic activity” than the decision to refrain from purchasing any 
other product.    
Finally, the Supreme Court’s Necessary and Proper Clause precedents give 
Congress wide latitude to determine what kinds of regulations are “necessary” to 
implement Congress’s other enumerated powers.  See, e.g., M’Culloch v. 
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Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316, 413-15 (1819) (ruling that such measures need 
not be “absolutely necessary,” but merely “useful” or “convenient” to the 
execution of other powers).  But they do not give Congress the kind of sweeping 
power asserted by the Department in this case.  Indeed, the individual mandate 
runs afoul of at least three of the five criteria for evaluating Necessary and Proper 
Clause cases recently utilized by the Supreme Court in United States v. Comstock, 
130 S. Ct. 1949 (2010).  Comstock  cited five factors in justifying its decision to 
uphold a claim of congressional power under the Necessary and Proper Clause: 
“(1) the breadth of the Necessary and Proper Clause, (2) the long history of federal 
involvement in this arena, (3) the sound reasons for the statute’s enactment in light 
of the government’s custodial interest in safeguarding the public from dangers 
posed by those in federal custody, (4) the statute’s accommodation of state 
interests, and (5) the statute’s narrow scope.”  Id. at 1965.  A majority of these 
criteria weigh against the individual mandate. 
 Section 1501 also violates the Necessary and Proper Clause’s requirement 
that legislation authorized by it must be “proper.”  Historical evidence suggests 
that “proper” legislation at the very least must not upset the constitutional balance 
of power between the federal and state governments by giving Congress virtually 
unlimited authority.  The logic of the Department’s argument for the individual 
mandate does just that.   
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ARGUMENT 
 
I.  THE INDIVIDUAL MANDATE IS NOT AUTHORIZED BY 
CONGRESS’S POWERS UNDER THE COMMERCE CLAUSE. 
 
 The Commerce Clause gives Congress the power to “regulate Commerce 
with foreign Nations, and among the several States, and with the Indian Tribes.” 
U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3. The Supreme Court divides Congress’s Commerce 
Clause powers into three categories: (1) regulation of “the use of the channels of 
interstate commerce”; (2) “[r]egulat[ion] and protect[ion] [of] the instrumentalities 
of interstate commerce, or persons or things in interstate commerce, even though 
the threat may come only from intrastate activities”; and (3) “regulat[ion] [of] . . .  
those activities that substantially affect interstate commerce.”  Lopez, 514 U.S. at 
558-59, 115 S. Ct. at 1629-30.  
 The individual mandate obviously does not fall under either the first or 
second of these categories.  The Department’s Commerce Clause argument instead 
hinges on the third category—regulation of “activities that substantially affect 
interstate commerce.” The fatal flaw in the Department’s position is that none of 
the Supreme Court precedents interpreting the Commerce Clause allow Congress 
to force ordinary individuals to engage in commercial activity.   
A.   Existing Commerce Clause Precedents Do Not Give Congress The 
Power To Regulate Mere Inactivity. 
 
 The Supreme Court has repeatedly emphasized that the Commerce Clause 
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does not grant Congress unlimited power.  “The Constitution . . . withhold[s] from 
Congress a plenary police power that would authorize enactment of every type of 
legislation.”  Lopez, 514 U.S. at 566, 115 S. Ct. at 1633; see also Morrison, 529 
U.S. at 608, 120 S. Ct. at 1748 (“Even under our modern, expansive interpretation 
of the Commerce Clause, Congress’ regulatory authority is not without effective 
bounds.”).        
Even the broadest judicial interpretations of the Commerce Clause do not 
give Congress the power to regulate inactivity.  Instead, they strictly limit 
Congress’s authority to the regulation of “economic activity” and noneconomic 
activity whose restriction is necessary for the implementation of a regulatory 
scheme aimed at controlling interstate commercial transactions.   
 1. Gonzales v. Raich. 
 The Supreme Court’s most expansive Commerce Clause precedent to date, 
Gonzales v. Raich, 545 U.S. 1, 125 S. Ct. 2195 (2005), illustrates this point well.  
Raich was the first and only case where the Court upheld the regulation of 
intrastate, noncommercial activity under the Commerce Clause.  Raich ruled that 
Congress’s power to regulate interstate commerce could justify a federal ban on 
the possession of medical marijuana that had never been sold in any market or left 
the state where it was grown.  Respondents Angel Raich and Diane Monson grew 
marijuana solely for personal consumption for medical purposes.  Id. at 7, 125 S. 
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Ct. at 2200.  Despite the lack of any direct involvement in commerce, the Supreme 
Court ruled that the Commerce Clause gave Congress the power to forbid this 
activity.  Although the Department relies heavily on Raich, see Appellants’ Br. at 
24-43, the decision fails to justify the individual mandate. 
 Raich interprets Congress’s Commerce power expansively in three ways:  by 
allowing Congress broad authority to regulate “economic activity”; by permitting 
regulation of noneconomic activity as part of a broader regulatory scheme aimed at 
interstate commercial activity; and, by applying a “rational basis” test.  But nothing 
in Raich supports the argument that the Commerce Clause authorizes Congress to 
regulate an individual’s decision not to engage in commercial activity.  
a. The individual mandate does not regulate “economic activity.” 
 Raich reaffirmed that Congress has the power to regulate “economic 
activity.” It adopted a broad definition of “economics,” which “refers to ‘the 
production, distribution, and consumption of commodities.’” Raich, 545 U.S. at 
25-26, 125 S. Ct. at 2211 (quoting WEBSTER’S THIRD NEW INTERNATIONAL 
DICTIONARY 720 (1966)).  Expansive as this definition may be, an individual’s 
mere status of being uninsured does not qualify. Choosing not to purchase health 
insurance involves neither production, nor distribution, nor consumption of 
commodities.  Indeed, someone who chooses not to purchase insurance has chosen 
not to consume or distribute the commodity in question.  Nor is he or she 
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“producing” any commodity by refusing to purchase insurance.  By contrast, the 
Raich defendants were engaged in “economic activity” since they were both 
producing and consuming marijuana.   
b. The individual mandate cannot be upheld as a regulation of 
noneconomic activity necessary to implement a broader 
regulatory scheme. 
 
 Like Lopez and Morrison before it, Raich indicates that “Congress may 
regulate even noneconomic local activity if that regulation is a necessary part of a 
more general regulation of interstate commerce.”  Id. at 37; 125 S. Ct. at 2217.  
But as all three cases demonstrate, this power applies only to the regulation of 
“noneconomic activity.”  Id.  It does not cover regulation of inactivity or the 
refusal to engage in economic transactions.  Angel Raich and Diane Monsen had 
not been inactive or merely refused to engage in some transaction.  To the 
contrary, they were actively involved in the production and consumption of 
medical marijuana.  
 If Raich was interpreted to permit regulation of mere inactivity, Congress 
would have the power to compel any citizen to help enforce its regulatory schemes.  
It could force individuals to purchase General Motors cars to assist the struggling 
auto industry, or to purchase financial products from banks that received federal 
bailout funds.  Likewise, Congress could require individuals to purchase products 
from any industry with political clout.  It could require individuals to purchase 
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memberships in exercise clubs in order to increase their physical fitness, which 
would further increase their economic productivity and stimulate interstate 
commerce.  See John H. Kerr  & Marjolein C. H. Vos, Employee Fitness 
Programmes, Absenteeism, and General Well-Being, 7 WORK & STRESS 179 
(1993) (providing evidence that employee physical fitness increases productivity).   
 In sum, there is no limit to the regulatory authority Congress could claim 
under the Department’s interpretation of the Commerce Clause.  The federal 
government would have the power to force citizens to engage in any activity that 
might conceivably affect commerce.  This is precisely the kind of unconstrained 
police power that the Supreme Court has expressly rejected.  See Morrison, 529 
U.S. at 618, 120 S. Ct. at 1754 (noting that “the police power” is “denied the 
National Government and reposed in the States”).  
c.  Raich’s rational basis test does not apply to this case. 
 Raich applied the deferential “rational basis” test to the government’s 
claims, ruling that “[w]e need not determine whether [defendants’] activities, taken 
in the aggregate, substantially affect interstate commerce in fact, but only whether 
a ‘rational basis’ exists for so concluding.” Raich, 545 U.S. at 22, 125 S. Ct. at 
2208.  The Department claimed below that the rational basis test should be applied 
in the present case as well, see R.E. at 130-33, and it repeats this argument in its 
opening brief on appeal.  See Appellants’ Br. at 24 (arguing that the court need 
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only determine “whether a ‘rational basis’ exists” for Congress to conclude that 
Americans’ collective health care decisions “‘substantially affect interstate 
commerce.’”). 
 But the Raich Court never indicated that the rational basis test applies in a 
case where the government seeks to regulate inactivity rather than positive action.  
Instead, the Court explicitly applied the test applied to the government’s regulation 
of Raich and Monsen’s “activities, taken in the aggregate.” Raich, 545 U.S. at 22, 
125 S. Ct. at 2208 (emphasis added).  
 The Department apparently assumes that Congress’s mere assertion of 
Commerce Clause authority is enough to trigger the rational basis test.  But neither 
Raich nor any previous Supreme Court precedent suggests this.  To the contrary, 
Raich applied the standard only to a regulation of “activity.”  
 Neither Lopez nor Morrison applied the deferential rational basis test, 
despite the government’s invocation of the Commerce Clause.  In Morrison, the 
Court struck down the challenged section of the Violence Against Women Act 
despite that the government’s claim of a substantial impact on interstate commerce 
was “supported by numerous [congressional] findings” that would have been more 
than enough to pass muster under the rational basis test.  Morrison, 529 U.S. at 
614, 120 S. Ct. at 1752.  Although Morrison did not explicitly reject the rational 
basis test, the Court’s failure to apply the test in favor of a considerably higher 
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standard of scrutiny suggests that, at the very least, rational basis review does not 
apply to regulations of intrastate noneconomic activity such as gun possession in a 
school zone (Lopez) or sexual violence (Morrison).   
 Indeed, both Lopez and Morrison emphasized that “‘simply because 
Congress may conclude that a particular activity substantially affects interstate 
commerce does not necessarily make it so.’” Lopez, 514 U.S. at 557 n.2, 115 S. Ct. 
at 1629 n.2 (quoting Hodel v. Va. Surface Mining & Reclamation Ass’n., Inc., 452 
U.S. 264, 311 101 S. Ct. 2352, 2376 (1981) (Rehnquist, J., concurring in 
judgment)); Morrison, 529 U.S. at 614, 120 S. Ct. at 1752 (same).  Had Lopez and 
Morrison applied the rational basis test, these decisions would inevitably have 
gone the other way.  In Morrison, Congress had compiled extensive evidence of 
possible effects of gender-based violence on interstate commerce.  Morrison, 529 
U.S. at 614, 120 S. Ct. at 1752.  In Lopez, Justice Breyer’s dissent indicated a 
variety of ways in which a rational basis existed for believing that gun possession 
in school zones might have such effects.  Lopez, 514 U.S. at 615-24, 115 S. Ct. at 
1657-65 (Breyer, J., dissenting).  As Justice Breyer emphasized, if we “ask 
whether Congress could have had a rational basis for finding a significant (or 
substantial) connection between gun-related school violence and interstate 
commerce . . . the answer  to this question must be yes.” Id. at 618, 115 S. Ct. at 
1659.  If the rational basis test does not apply to regulation of noneconomic 
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intrastate activity (as in Lopez and Morrison), it surely cannot apply to attempts to 
reach mere inactivity.   
          2. Other Commerce Clause precedents do not support the 
Department’s position. 
 
 The Supreme Court’s pre-Raich Commerce Clause precedents provide even 
less support than Raich for the Department’s position.  As the Court pointed out 
five years before Raich in Morrison, “in every case”  where it has “sustained 
federal regulation of intrastate activity based upon the activity’s substantial effects 
on interstate commerce, the activity in question has been some sort of economic 
endeavor” and had a “commercial character.” 529 U.S. at 611 n.4, 120 S. Ct. at 
1750 n.4. 
 Wickard v. Filburn, 317 U.S. 111, 63 S. Ct. 82 (1942), a case relied on by 
the Department, see Appellants’ Br. at 41-43, was one of the Supreme Court’s 
broadest interpretations of Congress’s Commerce Clause power.  Yet its facts 
differ radically from those of the present case.  Wickard upheld the 1938 
Agricultural Adjustment Act’s restrictions on wheat production as applied to 
Roscoe Filburn, an Ohio farmer who produced wheat for consumption on his own 
farm.  317 U.S. at 115, 121-27, 63 S. Ct. at 84, 87-90.  The Court noted that 
restriction of home-grown, home-consumed wheat was a necessary component of 
Congress’s scheme to “raise the market price of wheat” because, without such 
regulation, home-grown wheat could serve as a substitute for wheat sold in the 
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market and depress demand for the latter. Id. at 127-29, 63 S. Ct. at 90-91.  
 Unlike the instant case, Wickard addressed a regulation of economic 
activity.  Roscoe Filburn sold “a portion of [his wheat] crop” on the market and 
“fe[d] part to poultry and livestock on the farm, some of which is sold.” Id. at 114, 
63 S. Ct. at 84.  Filburn’s wheat production was unquestionably part of a 
commercial enterprise that sold goods in interstate commerce.  As the Court noted 
in Lopez, Wickard “involved economic activity in a way that possession of a gun in 
a school zone does not.” Lopez, 514 U.S. at 560, 115 S. Ct. at 1630.  
 Until Raich, all of the Court’s post-New Deal decisions sustaining exercises 
of congressional power under the Commerce Clause involved regulations of 
economic activity involving the sale or production of goods or services.3  Unlike 
the individual mandate, these laws clearly regulated preexisting commercial 
activity. 
  Nor is the individual mandate analogous to those cases upholding civil 
rights statutes that ban racial discrimination by motels and restaurants. See 
Katzenbach v. McClung, 379 U.S. 294, 85 S. Ct. 377 (1964) (upholding regulation 
                                                 
3 See, e.g., Hodel, 452 U.S. at 264, 101 S. Ct. 2352 (upholding regulation of 
commercial mining); Perez v. United States, 402 U.S. 146, 91 S. Ct. 1357 (1971) 
(upholding regulation of commercial loan sharking); United States v. Wrightwood 
Dairy Co., 315 U.S. 110, 62 S. Ct. 523 (1942) (upholding regulation of price of 
milk); United States v. Darby, 312 U.S. 100, 61 S. Ct. 451 (1941) (upholding Fair 
Labor Standards Act regulation of employment conditions); NLRB v. Jones & 
Laughlin Steel Corp., 301 U.S. 1, 57 S. Ct. 615 (1937) (upholding National Labor 
Relations Act regulation of  employment relations). 
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of discrimination against customers of a commercial restaurant); Heart of Atlanta 
Motel, Inc. v. United States, 379 U.S. 241, 85 S. Ct. 348 (1964) (upholding federal 
ban on discrimination against customers of a hotel serving interstate travelers).  
Such federal antidiscrimination laws apply only to businesses engaged in 
preexisting commercial activity in a regulated industry.  By contrast, uninsured 
individuals are by definition not participating in the insurance business.  Thus, the 
individual mandate is actually analogous to a statute that requires individuals to 
patronize a restaurant or hotel even if they had no previous intention of doing so.  
See Ilya Somin, The Individual Health Insurance Mandate and the Constitutional 
Text, ENGAGE, Vol. 11, No. 1, Mar. 2010, at 49.  
B.   The Status of Being Uninsured Is Not An Economic Activity. 
Apparently conceding that some “activity” is required to trigger the 
Commerce Clause power, the Department argues that the individual mandate 
regulates “the practice of consuming health care services without insurance.”  
Appellants’ Br. at 28.  Yet the individual mandate regulates neither consumption 
nor any other activity, but applies instead to virtually all uninsured Americans 
whether or not they consume health care services.  If the individual mandate 
operated as the Department claims, one could simply avoid the mandate by not 
consuming health care services; but such “opting out” is not allowed.    
The Department attempts to circumvent the constitutional bar on Commerce 
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Clause regulation of inactivity by depicting the state of being uninsured as activity 
under Supreme Court precedent.  This argument comes in two forms: a broad 
version claiming that any “economic decision” can be regulated under the 
Commerce Clause, and a narrow one focusing on supposedly unique characteristics 
of the health care market.  Both versions fail for similar reasons: they ultimately 
give Congress unconstrained power to mandate virtually anything, something the 
Supreme Court has repeatedly said is impermissible.  
 1. Economic decisions are not economic activities. 
 The broad version of the Department’s argument claims that any decision 
with economic effects qualifies as an economic activity.  See Appellants’ Br. at 39-
40 (“But such economic preferences are plainly subject to regulation under the 
Commerce Clause.”).  The Department cites with approval a district court decision 
upholding the mandate on the grounds that the Commerce Clause reaches not 
merely economic activity but economic choices.  See id. (citing Liberty Univ. Inc. 
v. Geithner, 2010 WL 4860299, at *15 (W.D. Va. Nov. 30, 2010)).   This recent 
decision by the Western District of Virginia concludes that “decisions to pay for 
health care without insurance are economic activities . . . .  Because of the nature 
of supply and demand, plaintiffs’ choices directly affect the price of insurance in 
the market, which Congress set out in the Act to control.” Liberty Univ., 2010 WL 
4860299, at *15. 
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 The flaw in this argument is obvious.  The “nature of supply and demand” 
means that any decision to do or not do anything will affect the price of some good 
or service.  If someone chooses not to purchase a car, that will affect the price of 
cars.  If a person chooses to sleep for an hour rather than work, he will earn less 
money, which in turn means that he will engage in less consumer spending or 
investment, which will affect the prices of various goods.  By this reasoning, 
Congress could not only force people to purchase any product of any kind, it could 
force them to engage in just about any other kind of activity that affects the price 
of some good or service that Congress sets out to control.  
 The Department’s “economic decisions” doctrine also contravenes Supreme 
Court precedent.  Under this approach, Lopez would have been decided the other 
way.  Carrying a gun into a school zone—the action forbidden by the Gun Free 
School Zones Act invalidated in that case—is clearly an “economic decision” 
under the Department’s reasoning.  In the aggregate, such actions surely have an 
effect on prices in various markets, including the market for guns and the market 
for illegal drugs in schools.  Indeed, Alfonso Lopez was paid $40 to carry his gun 
in a school zone for the purpose of transferring it to a member of a drug gang who 
probably intended to use it to defend the group’s commercial interests in a “gang 
war.” United States v. Lopez, 2 F.3d 1342, 1345 (5th Cir. 1993), aff’d, 514 U.S. 
549, 115 S. Ct. 1624 (1995). 
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2. No unique feature of the health insurance market transforms being 
uninsured into economic activity. 
 
 In addition to insisting that Congress can regulate any “economic decision,” 
the Department also argues that the individual mandate regulates “activity” 
because of the special nature of the health care market:  “[T]he means that 
Congress selected are specifically adapted to the unique conditions of the health 
care market: participation is essentially universal; the need for medical treatment 
may arise unexpectedly; the cost of care may overwhelm the typical family budget; 
and individuals are legally entitled to expensive medical services in times of need 
without regard to their ability to pay.”  Appellants’ Br. at 19. 
Since everyone eventually participates in the health care market, the 
Department reasons, choosing not to buy health insurance constitutes activity in 
the form of an economic decision to try to consume health care services later 
without paying for them.  See id. at 10 (“As a class, people who endeavor to pay 
for health care services through means other than insurance shift significant costs 
to other participants in the interstate health care market.”). 
 In reality, it is simply not true that everyone consumes health care.  Some 
people rely on charity or home remedies, while others never get sick enough to 
require medical treatment before they die.  And while it may be true that the 
overwhelming majority of people participate in the health care market in 
some way, this does not differentiate health care from virtually any other market.  
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If the relevant “market” is defined broadly enough, one can characterize any 
decision not to purchase a good or service exactly the same way.  Tellingly, the 
Department does not claim that everyone will inevitably purchase health 
insurance.  There are many other ways to get health care, including paying out of 
pocket, self-insurance, and relying on charity, among others.  The appellant defines 
the market as “health care services.”  Id. at 7 (emphasis added).   
The same sleight of hand could justify any other mandate Congress might 
care to impose.  As the district court below properly noted, “[u]niqueness is not an 
adequate limiting principle as every market problem is, at some level and in some 
respects, unique.  If Congress asserts power that exceeds its enumerated powers, 
then it is unconstitutional, regardless of the purported uniqueness of the context in 
which it is being asserted.” R.E. at 2050. 
 Consider the case of a mandate requiring everyone to purchase General 
Motors cars in order to help the auto industry.  There are many people who do not 
participate in the market for cars.  But just about everyone participates in the 
market for “transportation.”  In the words of the Department, “people who 
endeavor to pay for [transportation] services through means other than [car 
ownership] shift significant costs to other participants in the interstate 
[transportation] market.” Appellants’ Br. at 10.  After all, everyone moves from 
place to place in some way. 
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 The same logic can be used to justify virtually any other mandate Congress 
might care to impose—even a mandate requiring everyone to see the most recent 
Harry Potter movie.  After all, just about everyone participates in the market for 
entertainment.  Choosing not to go to the movies is just an “economic decision” to 
pay for entertainment services later. 
 The same flaw undermines the claim that health care is distinctive because 
service providers are sometimes required to provide free care.  See, e.g., Mead v. 
Holder, Civ. No. 10-950 (GK), 2011 WL 611139, at *18 (D.D.C. Feb. 22, 2011).  
The only reason why that difference may be constitutionally relevant is that failing 
to purchase health insurance has adverse economic effects on producers.  But, in 
that respect, failing to purchase insurance turns out to be no different from failing 
to purchase any other product.  Whenever someone fails to purchase a product, 
producers are made economically worse off than they would be if the potential 
buyer had made a different decision.      
Health insurance is undoubtedly an important good.  But it has no unique 
characteristics that transform failure to purchase it into an “economic activity.” 
II. THE INDIVIDUAL MANDATE IS NOT AUTHORIZED BY THE 
NECESSARY AND PROPER CLAUSE. 
 
 The Necessary and Proper Clause gives Congress the authority to “make all 
Laws which shall be necessary and proper for carrying into Execution the 
foregoing Powers, and all other Powers vested by this Constitution in the 
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Government of the United States, or in any Department or Officer thereof.”  U.S. 
CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 18.  The Supreme Court has described the Clause as “the last, 
best hope of those who defend ultra vires congressional action.” Printz v. United 
States, 521 U.S. 898, 923, 117 S. Ct. 2365, 2378-79 (1997).  But if the individual 
mandate cannot be upheld under the Commerce Clause, the Necessary and Proper 
Clause cannot salvage it. 
 The Department contends that the individual mandate is permissible under 
the Necessary and Proper Clause because it is needed to effectuate the PPACA’s 
regulations forcing insurance companies to accept customers with preexisting 
health conditions, which is an exercise of Congress’s Commerce Clause authority.  
In its amicus brief in a parallel lawsuit, WLF refuted the claim that the Necessary 
and Proper Clause authorizes the individual mandate.  See Amicus Br. of Wash. 
Legal Found., Commonwealth of Virginia  v. Sebelius, 2010 WL 2661289 (E.D. 
Va. June 18, 2010).   
 Here, amici emphasize two critical points: that the individual mandate runs 
afoul of the standards for Necessary and Proper Clause claims established by the 
Supreme Court in its recent decision in United States v. Comstock, 130 S.Ct. 1949 
(2010), and that it fails the requirement that any exercise of federal power under 
the Clause be “proper” as well as “necessary.” 
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A.  The Scope Of The Necessary And Proper Clause. 
 The Necessary and Proper Clause is not a free-standing grant of power.  
Instead, it gives Congress only the authority to enact legislation that “carr[ies] into 
Execution” other powers granted to the federal government by the Constitution.  
U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 18.  The Supreme Court recently reiterated this principle, 
emphasizing that every statute authorized by the Necessary and Proper Clause 
“must itself be legitimately predicated on an enumerated power.”  Comstock, 130 
S. Ct. at 1964; see also Kinsella v. Singleton, 361 U.S. 234, 247-48, 80 S. Ct. 297, 
304 (1960) (noting that the Necessary and Proper Clause “by itself, creates no 
constitutional power”). 
 But even if a statute actually helps to execute an enumerated power, it still 
may not be authorized by the Necessary and Proper Clause.  In its famous ruling in 
M’Culloch v. Maryland, the Supreme Court outlined several constraints on 
Congress’s power under the Necessary and Proper Clause: 
Let the end be legitimate, let it be within the scope of the 
constitution, and all means which are appropriate, which are 
plainly adapted to that end, which are not prohibited, but 
consist with the letter and spirit of the constitution, are 
constitutional.  
  
M’Culloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316, 421 (1819). 
 
 This passage outlines four constraints on the range of statutes authorized by 
the Necessary and Proper Clause: (1) the “end” pursued must be “legitimate” and 
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“within the scope of the constitution”; (2) the means must be “appropriate” and 
“plainly adapted to that end”; (3) the means must “not [be] prohibited” elsewhere 
in the Constitution; and, finally (4) the means must be “consist[ent] with the letter 
and spirit of the Constitution.”  A statute that is “improper” in nature can be 
rejected as inconsistent “with the letter and spirit of the Constitution” or because it 
is “inappropriate.”  
B. The Individual Mandate Fails The Five-Part Test Adopted By The 
Supreme Court In United States v. Comstock. 
  
 In United States v. Comstock, the Supreme Court held that Section 4248 of 
the Adam Walsh Act was valid under the Necessary and Proper Clause.  See 
Comstock, 130 S.Ct. at 1956-67.  That provision gave federal prison officials the 
power to detain “sexually dangerous” federal prisoners after the completion of 
their sentences.  See 42 U.S.C. § 4248.  The Court cited five factors justifying its 
decision to uphold Section 4248: “(1) the breadth of the Necessary and Proper 
Clause, (2) the long history of federal involvement in this arena, (3) the sound 
reasons for the statute’s enactment in light of the Government’s custodial interest 
in safeguarding the public from dangers posed by those in federal custody, (4) the 
statute’s accommodation of state interests, and (5) the statute’s narrow scope.”  Id. 
at 1965.  
 A majority of these criteria weigh against the individual mandate: the lack of 
a deep history of federal involvement, the failure of the PPACA to accommodate 
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state interests, and the statute’s extraordinarily broad scope.  A fourth factor (the 
possible lack of “sound reasons” for the statute’s enactment) is potentially 
ambiguous. The fifth—“the breadth of the Necessary and Proper Clause”—is a 
constant that does not vary from case to case.  See Ilya Somin, Taking Stock of 
Comstock: The Necessary and Proper Clause and the Limits of Federal Power, 
2009-10 CATO SUP. CT. REV. 239, 260-67 (assessing implications of Comstock for 
the present case). 
1.  The individual mandate is not backed by a long history of federal 
involvement  
 
 As the district court emphasized below, “the notion of Congress having 
power under the Commerce Clause to directly impose an individual mandate to 
purchase health insurance is ‘novel’ and ‘unprecedented.’” R.E. at 2039.  There is 
no history of comparable federal regulation.  Although the federal government has 
adopted previous statutes regulating health care, it has never compelled ordinary 
citizens to purchase health insurance or other health care products.  It has never 
forced citizens to purchase products of any kind merely as a consequence of their 
status as residents of the United States.  See id. (“Never before has Congress 
required everyone to buy a product from a private company (essentially for life) 
just for being alive and residing in the United States.”).  Nor have the courts 
previously sustained such a law.  
Comstock relied on a 155-year history of federal involvement in the relevant 
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field.  See Comstock, 130 S. Ct. at 1958-59 (tracing the relevant history of federal 
involvement back to 1855). There is no history of previous federal regulation 
remotely comparable to the individual mandate.  Indeed, the Supreme Court denied 
Congress the power to regulate insurance policies (for health care or otherwise) 
until 1944, when it overruled longstanding precedents forbidding such regulation.  
See United States v. S.E. Underwriters, 322 U.S. 533, 64 S. Ct. 1162 (1944).  Until 
only the last few decades, there was very little federal health care regulation of any 
kind.   
In contrast to the lengthy history of federal involvement at issue in 
Comstock, “[f]ederal involvement in health is a fairly new occurrence in U.S. 
history.”  Jennie Jacobs Kronenfeld, THE CHANGING FEDERAL ROLE IN U.S. 
HEALTH CARE POLICY 67 (Praeger Publishers, 1997) (emphasis added).  “While a 
few laws and special concerns were passed prior to the twentieth century, the bulk 
of the federal health legislation that has health impact . . . has actually been passed 
in the past 50 or so years.”  Id.  Indeed, modern health care in the United States 
“occupies a completely different place in the economy, in the mind of the public, 
and in its impact on the government at all levels than it did 100 years ago, at the 
beginning of the twentieth century, or at the beginning of the country in the late 
1700s, when the U.S. Constitution was adopted.”  Id. at 1. 
     
Case: 11-11021     Date Filed: 05/11/2011     Page: 34 of 42
 26 
 
 2. The individual mandate does not accommodate state interests. 
 Section 4248 of the Adam Walsh Act accommodated state interests by 
giving states the option of confining “sexually dangerous” former prisoners 
themselves.  Comstock, 130 S. Ct. at 1962-63.  Indeed, it even let states assume 
custody of the former prisoners and then release them at will.  Id. at 1963.  The 
federal government could confine a “sexually dangerous” former federal inmate 
only if the state government consented to it.  And the state could even assume 
custody of the inmate in question and immediately set him free.  Id.  
In contrast, the PPACA’s individual mandate applies throughout the country, 
even in the many states where elected state governments oppose it and would 
prefer a different system of health insurance regulation.  Moreover, states are given 
no right to avoid the mandate or exempt their citizens from it.  Significantly, a 
majority of the states in the nation have now challenged the constitutionality of the 
individual mandate, a strong indication that many state governments believe the 
PPACA runs counter to their interests.  Far from “requir[ing] accommodation of 
state interests,” the individual mandate runs roughshod over them.  Comstock, 130 
S.Ct. at 1962 (emphasis in the original). 
 3. The individual mandate is extremely broad in scope. 
 Comstock upheld Section 4248 in large part because of its “narrow scope.”  
Id. at 1965.  It emphasized the fact that the statute “has been applied to only a 
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small fraction of federal prisoners.”  Id. at 1964.   In marked contrast, the 
individual mandate is extraordinarily broad.  It forces millions of people to 
purchase insurance products against their will.  As the text of PPACA itself 
indicates, “[t]he requirement, together with the other provisions of this Act, will 
add millions of new consumers to the health insurance market.”  PPACA § 
1501(a)(2)(C).  
 The individual mandate clearly fails at least three prongs of the five-part test 
laid out in Comstock.  The other two do little to strengthen it.  Whether Congress 
enjoyed “sound reasons” for enacting the mandate is at the very least debatable.  
Many economists believe that it is possible to provide coverage for preexisting 
conditions without resorting to compulsion on the massive scale undertaken by the 
PPACA.  See, e.g., John H. Cochrane, What to Do About Preexisting Conditions, 
WALL ST. J., Aug. 14, 2009.  At the very least, the “sound reasons” underlying the 
mandate are not nearly as clear as those supporting Section 4248 in Comstock.
 The final consideration outlined in Comstock is the “breadth of the 
Necessary and Proper Clause.” Comstock, 130 S.Ct. at 1965.  This factor, however, 
is identical in every case.  It cannot by itself justify upholding a statute.  If it could, 
the other four considerations would be superfluous. 
 In sum, a majority of the factors outlined in the five-part Comstock test 
weigh heavily against the mandate.  A fourth is ambiguous at best.  And the final 
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factor never varies from case to case, and therefore cannot be the basis for 
upholding legislation on its own.  
C. The Individual Mandate Is Not “Proper.” 
 In order to be a valid exercise of congressional power under the Necessary 
and Proper Clause, a statute must be “proper” as well as “necessary.”  See Printz, 
521 U.S. at 923-24, 117 S. Ct. at 2378-79 (holding that a law that is not “proper” 
can exceed the scope of Congress’s power under the Necessary & Proper Clause).  
The Supreme Court has provided very little guidance on the definition of “proper.”  
But evidence from the Founding era suggests that a proper statute must, at the very 
least, not depend on a constitutional rationale that gives Congress virtually 
unlimited power to legislate in areas traditionally reserved to the states.4 As James 
Madison explained in Federalist No. 39, the Constitution does not give the federal 
government “an indefinite supremacy over all persons and things.”  THE 
FEDERALIST NO. 39. 
                                                 
4 See Randy E. Barnett, The Original Meaning of the Necessary and Proper 
Clause, 6 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 183, 215-20 (2003) (discussing the relevant 
evidence); Gary Lawson & Patricia Granger, The “Proper” Scope of Federal 
Power: A Jurisdictional Interpretation of the Sweeping Clause, 43 DUKE L.J. 267,  
297 (1993) (arguing that the evidence shows that “proper” means that laws “must 
be consistent with principles of separation of powers, principles of federalism, and 
individual rights”); Kurt T. Lash, A Textual-Historical Theory of the Ninth 
Amendment, 60 STAN. L. REV. 895, 921 (2008) (citing evidence that the original 
meaning of the Constitution  precludes any reading of  the Necessary and Proper 
Clause that has “the effect of completely obliterating the people's retained right to 
local self-government”).   
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 The Department’s interpretation of the Clause threatens to do just that.  
Remarkably, it contends that “[g]overning precedent does not permit a court to 
override Congress’s judgment about the appropriate means to achieve objectives” 
where a provision is “rationally related to the exercise of a constitutionally 
enumerated power.”  Appellants’ Br. at 33, 34.  But virtually any imaginable 
regulatory measure is “rationally related” to some enumerated power in some way.  
For example, a federal statute requiring citizens to exercise every day is rationally 
related to Congress’s power to raise and support armies.  See U.S. CONST. Art. I, § 
8, cl. 12.  Citizens who exercise regularly might make more effective draftees.  
Similarly, a statute requiring individuals to wake up early might increase their 
economic productivity by ensuring that they get to work earlier, and would thereby 
be “rationally related” to Congress’s power to regulate interstate commerce.  
 The Department claims that such a sweeping interpretation of the Necessary 
and Proper Clause was adopted by the Court in Comstock.  See Appellants’ Br. at 
33-34 (quoting Comstock, 130 S. Ct. at 1957).  Comstock did indeed indicate that 
“in determining whether the Necessary and Proper Clause grants Congress the 
legislative authority to enact a particular federal statute, we look to see whether the 
statute constitutes a means that is rationally related to the implementation of a 
constitutionally enumerated power.” Comstock, 130 S.Ct. at 1956-57.  But the fact 
that courts must “look to” the presence or absence of a “rational relationship” does 
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not mean that this is the end of the constitutional inquiry.  The Court also indicated 
that assertions of federal power under the Necessary and Proper Clause are subject 
to the five-factor test described above.  If a rational relationship were sufficient in 
and of itself, Congress would have “a plenary police power that would authorize 
enactment of every type of legislation.”  Lopez, 514 U.S. at 566, 115 S. Ct. at 
1633.  
CONCLUSION 
 
 For the foregoing reasons, amici respectfully request that the Court affirm 
the judgment below.  
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